T is a principle universally recognized throughout our system of law, that no person shall be permitted to occupy a position of trust and confidence who at the same time is clearly subject to influences hostile to a faithful performance of his trust. There is a rule as old as Chrigtianity, and it has been incorporated into our law from the earliest times, that "no man shall serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will -hold to the one and despise the other." Fiduciary relations can rest upon no foundation but absolute integrity. Once destroy the inviolate sanctity of the trust relation and the moral basis for social institutions will begin to crumble away. The law has, in this particular, been ever vigilant to ward off the least encroachment upon the high :'andards of conduct exacted from those-who hold positions of trust and confidence.
Bilt the temptations to dishonesty are necessarily so great, even under the most favored conditions, that the law will not even periiit the trustee to be placed in a situation which has an intrinsic ,,Idency to encourage unfaithfulness. It makes io difference, that fe trustee may be honest and intend no default. Public policy de&nands that the temptation itself be removed so far as possible, in order to throw an additional and needed safeguard about the performance of trust duties. An agent may not deal with himself; an agent to sell may not at the same time, and in respect to the same property, be an agent to buy; an executor may not purchase at his own sale; a trustee r'iay not invest trust funds in his own business nor mingle them with his own funds; a judge may not sit in his own case; even a notary may not so much as take an acknowledgment when he has the slightest interest in the subject matter of the instrument. In none of these cases will it suffice to show that no fraud resulted nor loss occurred. The law looks deeper than the immediate results,of the particular case; it looks to the underlying tendencies of the situation and pronounces thei dangerous and fraught with evil consequences. Therefore it prohibits the situation itself.
In the light of these well recognized principles of legal morality, what answer should be given to the following question, which is the particular subject of the present article?-MaIy an adninistrator or executor be permitted to show that he cannot collect a debt due front himself?
An administrator (and for the purposes of this discussion the term may be considered as synonymous with executor) who is at the same time a debtor, occupies inconsistent and antagonistic oositions. As administrator it is his duty to collect the debt; as debtor it is to his interest to avoid its payment. If he .can persuade himself as administrator that as debtor he is unable to' pay, he may save the amount of the debt. There is no one to question his course. He is the person appointed and designated by law to collect nd administer all debts due the estate. No one can suk him. He who owes the debt is the only person authorized to enforce its collection. A situation such as this would seem to fall clearly within the general principles already outlined. It would seem to be governed by such a case as Everhart v. Searle," where the court says: "He that is entrusted with the interests of others cannot be allowed to make the business an object of interest to himself, because, from a frailty of nature, one who has the power will be too readily seized with the inclination to use the opportunity for serving his own interest at the .expense of those for whonq he is interested. The danger of temptation from the facility and advantage of doing wrong which a particular situation affords does, out of the mere necessity, work a disqualification."
As a fact there is a hopeless conflict among the cases upon this question. It seems to be an instance of hard cases making much bad law. i The leading case in this country is Stevens v. Gaylord. 2 In this cdse, Which has been cited in almost every case upon the question decided since the year 1814, the court says : "It is well settled, that when the creditor makes his debtor executor, it is a discharge of the action for the debt. * * * It is not always 'a release or extinguishment of the debt; for it is assets' to pay creditors, if wanted for that purpose. It is also assets to pay legacies, or distribute among the next of kin, when the debt is not itself given as a legacy to the executor. It seems more correct to say that although the duty ifemains'in some cases, and for sorhe purposes, yet the right of action' Is always discharged; because the executor cannot sue himdelf. * * * e reason, it is obvious, applies with equal force to an administ rator. * * * As soon as the debtor is appointed adniministrator, it.
e acknowledges the debt, he has actually received so much. money,l and is answerable for it. This is the result with respect to an executor; and the same reason applies to an administrator; as the samd. hand is to receive and pay, and there is no ceremony "to be performed in paying the debt,.and no made of doing it, but by considering the The fact remains to be noted, however, that in" these cases the point was never raised as to whether insolvency on the part of the administrator would render the rule inoperative, so as to relieve the sureties on his official bond. In all of them, nevertheless, the rule was stated in general terms.
But the point has been raised in a considerable number of cases, and while many courts have refused to allow this feature to affect the rule, other courts have made an exception under such circumstances. It is here that hard cases have made bad law. Tenderness for the sureties on the administrator's bond has induced many courts to engraft upon a most wholesome rule an exception which lets in just the.mischiefs which the rule was designed to keep out.
An exception of this nature holds out a strong inducement to unscrupulous administrators to feign insolvency or to put themselves temporarily in that condition, as a means of perpetrating a fraud upon the estate. Estates of decedents are notoriously subject to be preyed upon .by dishonest trustees. They should be guardedby the courts with peculiar care..
The necessity for rigorous rules in this regard has been felt and expressed by many of the courts before which it has been sought to plead insolvency as a ground of exemption from strict accountability. The Supreme Court of Oregon, in Masot's Estate, 21 said on this question: "Every reason for this doctrine [that the debt be deemed realized assets] is strengthened when liability on the ground of the executor's insolvency is sought to be evaded. That is a matter which the beneficiaries of the estate are entitled, under every principle of right and justice, to have determined by the ordinary processes of the law in a proceeding where the debtor does not occupy the conflicting relations of a representative' of the estate charged with the duty of diligence in its behalf, and a debtor whose interest it would be to avoid payment. '.endered by Department One of the Supreme Court of California in x895. The court says: -"This debt was as money in the hands of the executor, and, as such, was a part of the estate for the due administration of which the sureties became liable, just as they did for the residue thereof. The poverty or riches of the principal, the condition of the estate, where and how invested, were proper subjects of inquiry for the sureties in. determining whether or not to become responsible, but cannot be urged as reasons to excuse them from the liability which they assumed. Nor can the representation of their principal as to his financial position, or his failur6 so to do, avail the sureties. Should such circumstances prevail to release stireties, it is apprehended few would be bound. * * * The case serves to illustrate the wisdom of Solomon, where he says (Proverbs, xi., 15) 'He that is surety for a stranger shall smart for it, and he that hatetti suretyshipis sure.'" But in spite of this sound and sensible view, so unambiguously expressed, the court, in Department Two, squarely reversed itself only three years later, in the case of Estate of Walker.
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Truly sureties are favorites of the" law! In California, as well as in some other states, such as Ohio, New York, and Oregon, the general rule has been deemed of such vital importance that the legislature has put it in the mandatory form of a statute. Nevertheless, the courts in two of these states, have, by construction, so changed the scope and character of the statute as to lirhit its application to cases of solvent administrators.
Five other states, in whose courts the question has been presented, have squarely asserted the sound doctrine that insolvency on the part of the administrator in no wise militates against the general rule. In Alabama, through a series of no less than ten decisions, that able court has consistently maintained that the fiduciary character of the administrator's position demands a rigid safeguarding of absolute integrity under all circumstances. 0 was a case in which it was sought to obtain a ruling upon this question, but the court held that the question was not properly before it and wisely refused to pass upon it. But in 1896 the question was directly presented in Judge of Probate v. Sulloway, 3 0 and the court said, in the course of its opinion: ."He [the Judge of Probate] has authority to determine whether the indebtedness exists, and the extent of it, and there his authority ends. If the debt is admitted or found, the Judge of Probate has no choicehe must charge it to the executor as a part of the assets belonging to the estate. This duty is imperative. He cannot authorize the executor to compromise with himself, nor has he any authority to negotiate and compromise with the executor. It is wise that such should be the law. If it were otherwise it would open a wide door to fraud. 'On technical grounds, as well as on considerations of policy, an administrator is not permitted to show that he could not collect a debt due from himself.' SHAW, C. J., in Kinney v. Ensign, 18 Pick. 232, 236." And upon the plea that the bondsmen of the' administrator should be permitted to show his insolvency in their own defense, the court said: "In other words, when the executor is solvent and able to pay, and no surety is needed, the surety is responsible for the debt; but when the executor is'unable to pay and a surety's liability would be valuable, the surety is not liable." And the court considered this reductio ad absurdum a sufficient answer to the. plea.-In Pennsylvania, the reporter has introduced some uncertainty as to the doctrine of Garber v. Commnonwealth, 31 the only case in that state where the question seems to have been raised.* In his abstract of the argument, after stating the claim of the plaintiff" in error, that the administrator, who was a debtor to the estate, could not claim credit before the auditor for his debt, on account of his own insolvency, this statement appears in brackets, "'Per curiam.-He should have done so for the sake of his sureties." This is all there is in the case relative to the point under discussion, and the case is perhaps hardly vorthy of mention except for the fact that it has been cited by one or two other courts as an a'uthority for the rule that insolvency is a defense to a debtor who becomes administrator of his creditor's estate.
Prior to the year 1902, the real weight of the authority supporting the limitation of the rule to cases of solvent administrators, was very slight and unsatisfactory. Wehave already noted the decision of Department Two of the Supreme Court of California, in Estate of Walker, 3 2 squarely in opposition to the opinion of Department One in Treweek v. Howard. 33 A feeble attempt was made in the later case to distinguish it from the earlier, on the ground that one was an instance of an execvwor while-the other was an instance of an administrator. But the two are substantially in direct conflict, leaving the two departments of that state completely at variance.
Two New Jersey cases, Harker v. Irick,4 and Ordinary v. Kershaw, 3 3 are frequentlv cited in support of the qualified rule. Neither case, however,, was decided by the highest court of that state. Each was the decision of a single judge, the decision in the Harker case being rendered by the Chancellor and that in the other being rendered by the Ordinary. Neither case was appealed. Furthermore, an examination bf each case shows -the doctrine in this point to be a mere obiter dictin.
Although New York has spread the-general rule upon its statute books, yet the limitation in question has been announced by the courts of that state. Baitclis v. Barr 6 was a case at Special Term. JUSTIcE LANDON, who wrote the opinion, cited* only the two New Jersey cases discussed above, the Pennsylvania case 'of Garber v.' Commonwealth, 37 already referred to, and a Missouri case to -be presently mentioned. On appeal to the General Term no cases at all were cited in the opinion affirming the decision below. And on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the case was affirmed without any opinion being written. Furthermore, this formal affirmance was concurred in by a bare majority of the court, EARL, J., dissenting, ute, though the court declared obiter that, in its opinion, no matter how the statute might have read, the sureties of an insolvent executor could not have been held liable, "unless indeed the creative faculty be accorded to our lawmakers or the touch of Midas to their enactments."
In Indiana, also, the court has stated an opinion favoring the qualified rule, but it was purely and confessedly obiter. 40 Two cases, one in Vermont 4 and the other in Tennessee4-are authoritative and unequivocal adjudications in support of exempting an insolvent administrator from the operation of the rule. But the Tennessee court cites no cases whatever, and the Vermont court refers only to the cases cited in Baucus v. Barr at Special Term, together with an early New York case.
But in the year 19o2 appeared the first opinion laying any claim to thoroughness which supported the exemption of insolvent administrators. This was a commissioner's opinion in the case of In re Howell's Estate. 43 Most of the cases on each side of the question are referred to, and the statements of text writers are liberally quoted. The cases are not analyzed with care, but the case has undoubtedly given, much additional strength to the view that if an administrator can convince the Probate Court of his insolvency, he can escape liability for the debt he owes to the estate.
The influence of this Nebraska case has already shown itself, in a very recent decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan. This is the case of Sanders v. Dodge. 44 The court quotes more than half of the long opinion in the Nebraska case, and decides the question on the authority of the reasoning and cases appearing therein.
One other very recent case has announced the same view. The case of Iickman v. Kamp's Adm'r. 45 has already been referred to as supporting a thorough-going application of the general rule, weakened by no limitations. In 19o4, in the case of Buckel v. Smith's Adm'r.,48 the court suggested its approval of the rule as qualified, making insolvency of the administrator a defense to an action against his sureties. Curiously, the Hickman case is not referred to, and the court says that. the question of liability in the case of an insolvent administrator does not seem to have been raised in that state. The case is not particularly well reasoned, and smacks some-what of obiter dictum, inasmuch as the court says that the administrator in fact seemed to have money enough to pay. But it probably indicates the rule which is now to be enforced in Kentucky.
Three states, Nebraska, 'Michigan and Kentucky, are thus seen to have adopted the qualified rule of liability, within the last four years. The only reason, independent of statute, suggested in any case which advocates that view. is the hardship upon the sureties. This does not seem a sufficient justification for relaxing the safeguards which the law deems so essential for the preservation of the trust relation. The principles of equity prescribe, in the interests of an enlightened public policy, that no person, who occupies a position of trust and confidence, shall be permilted at the same time to sustain such personal relations to the subject matter of the trust, that self-interest can become a direct cohipetitor with the most scrupulous fidelity. Any departure from this wholesome principle is too likely to open the door to fraud.
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